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Abstract. Current approaches to semantics in the geospatial domain are 
mainly based on ontologies, but ontologies, since continue to build entirely 
on the symbolic methodology, suffers from the classical problems, e.g. the 
symbol grounding problem, affecting representational theories. We claim 
for an enactive approach to semantics, where meaning is considered to be 
an emergent feature arising context-dependently in action. Since 
representational theories are unable to deal with context, a new formalism 
is required toward a contextual theory of concepts. SCOP is considered a 
promising formalism in this sense and is briefly described. 
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1 Introduction 
The current scene of Geographic Information (GI) is characterised by the 
provision of services, in a distributed information systems environment, 
that enable to integrate distributed information resources  
Dealing with data integration basically implies addressing two main 
types of heterogeneity: data heterogeneity and semantic heterogeneity. 
Data heterogeneity refers to differences in data in terms of data type and 
data formats, while semantic heterogeneity applies to the meaning of the 
data (Hakimpour 2001); semantic heterogeneity may consists of naming 
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heterogeneities -when different words/expressions are used for the same 
(semantically alike) concept- and conceptual heterogeneities -when 
different people and or disciplines have a different interpretation, 
conceptualisation of the same “thing”- (Bishr 1998). 
The Open Geospatial Consortium and the ISO TC 211 provide 
specifications and standards supporting the deployment of geospatial web 
services. These specifications and standards address the interoperability 
issue at syntactic level, but are limited in terms of semantics and do not 
provide a consistent model for the semantics integration/composition of 
geospatial services (Einspanier 2003). 
Coping with semantic interoperability is a challenging task, since it has 
more to do with how people perceive and give meaning to “things”, rather 
then with integrating software components through standard interfaces 
(Harvey 1999).  
Semantics deals with aspects of meaning as expressed in a language, 
either natural or technical such as a computer language, and is 
complementary to syntax which deals with the structure of signs (focusing 
on the form) used by the language itself. In the area of distributed data 
sources and services, semantic interoperability refers to the ability of 
systems to exchange data and functionalities in a meaningful way. 
Semantic heterogeneity occurs when there is no agreement of the meaning 
of the same data and/or service functionality. 
Data creation happens in a context or in an application domain where 
concepts and semantics are clear to the data creator, either because they are 
explicitly formalised either they are naturally applied due to a yearly 
experience. But with distributed data resources this context is missed and 
unknown to the end user. This means that, in order to achieve semantic 
interoperability, semantics should be formally and explicitly represented 
(Kuhn 2005). 
Current approaches to overcome semantic heterogeneities rely on the 
use of ontologies and reasoning engines for concepts matching among 
different ontologies. The main drawback is that ontologies, being forms of 
a priori agreements, are decontextualised and decontextualise experience; 
instead our assumption is that semantics reconciliation depends on 
contextual human sense-making. This claims for a new formalism for 
geospatial semantics. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: section 2 deals with the 
semantics issue in the broader context of cognitive sciences; section 3 
briefly summarises current approaches to semantics in distributed 
information systems; section 4 summarises current approaches to 
semantics in the GI arena; section 5 introduces the SCOP formalism 
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2 Semantics 
There is a general agreement on considering that semantics deals with 
relationships between linguistic expressions and their meaning; but when it 
turns do define such relationships opinions highly diverge (Gärdenfors 
2000) in a dispute which is mainly philosophical. 
Dealing with formal semantics means opting for one of the two 
following paradigms, and the choice is mostly philosophical: 
• Realistic semantics, which comes in two flavours: 
- Extensional: in extensional semantics terms of a language L are 
mapped onto a “world” W. The main aim is to determine truth 
conditions for sentences in L against W. Extensional semantics is 
rooted in Tarski’s model theory for first order logic, where sentences 
from a language get their meaning via a correspondence to a model 
assumed to be a representation of the world: this meaning is 
independent of how people understand it; 
- Intentional: in intentional semantics the language L is mapped onto 
a set of possible worlds, and the aim continues to be that of providing  
truth conditions for sentences in L; 
• Cognitive semantics: in cognitive semantics the meanings of sentences 
are “mental”, and linguistic expressions are mapped onto cognitive 
structures. According to Gärdenfors (2000): (i) meaning is a 
conceptualisation in a cognitive model and is independent of truth; (ii) 
cognitive models are mainly perceptual; (iii) semantic elements are 
based on spatial and topological objects, and are not symbols; (iv) 
cognitive models are image schematic and not propositional; (v) 
semantics is primary to syntax; (vi) concepts show prototype effects. 
 
In order to analyse the semantics issue in a broader context we need to 
shift our focus to developments in the field of cognitive sciences. A critical 
review of cognitive sciences evolution can be found, for example, in 
(Anderson 2003), (Froese 2007), (Steels 2007), (Dreyfus 2007), 
(Gärdenfors 1999), (Licata 2008). 
Cognitive Sciences is an interdisciplinary field of investigation, with 
ideas coming from several disciplines such as philosophy, psychology, 
neurosciences, linguistics, computer science, anthropology, biology, and 
physics. The main aim of cognitive sciences is trying to answer questions 
such as “What is reason? How do we make sense of our experience? What 
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is a conceptual system and how is organised? Do all people use the same 
conceptual system?” (Lakoff 1987, xi) 
Two main different approaches try to answer these questions in different 
ways. The traditional approach claims that reasoning/cognition is 
essentially a form of information processing oriented to problem solving. It 
comes in two flavours: cognitivism, which sees the human brain as a 
deterministic machine manipulating symbols in an algorithmic way; 
connectionism, which uses a sub-symbolic representation and considers 
cognition as emergent from a network of atomic components (Artificial 
Neural Networks).  
The new approach is characterised by the so-called embodied-embedded 
mind hypothesis and its variants and extensions, such as situated 
cognition, and enactivism. Two terms are borrowed from Lakoff (1987) to 
indicate the two approaches; objectivism for the traditional approach, and 
experiential realism for the new approach: 
2.1 Objectivism 
Objectivism assumes that reason and cognition consist of symbols 
manipulation, where symbols get meaning through a correspondence to the 
real world (or possible worlds) objectively defined and independent of any 
interaction with human beings: incidentally this means that cognition is 
substantially context-free. Since the approach involves computation, it is 
also known as computationalism (Licata 2008), (Gärdenfors 2000). 
Objectivism is rooted in the logical positivism wave of analytical 
philosophy as formalised at the beginning of the 20th century by the 
Vienna Circle. The assumption is that scientific reasoning is based on 
observational data derived from experiments: new knowledge is acquired 
from data through logically valid inferences. Only hypothesis grounded in 
first-order logic with model-theoretic interpretations – or some equivalent 
formalism – have a scientific validity. 
Objectivism is also reductionist since it assumes that a system can be 
totally analysed and defined in terms of its components, in a kind of divide 
et impera process. The main fallacy of the reductionist hypothesis is to 
give for granted the reversibility of the process, but the hypothesis is not 
necessarily constructionist: 
 “… the more the elementary particle physicists tell us about nature 
of the fundamental laws, the less relevance they seem to have [...] to 
the rest of science. [...] The behaviour of large and complex 
aggregates of elementary particles [...] is not to be understood in 
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terms of a simple extrapolation of the properties of few particles. 
[...] at each level of complexity entirely new properties appear ...”  
(Anderson 1972, 393). 
We may summarise the fundamental views of objectivism as follows 
(Lakoff 1987): 
• the mind can be considered as a computer (a Turing machine); 
• symbols get their meaning in relation to “things” in the real world, thus 
they are internal representations of an external objective reality 
independent of human being; 
• thought is context-free and disembodied; 
• categorisation is the way we make sense of experience and categories 
are defined via sharing necessary and sufficient memberships properties; 
• category symbols are grounded (get their meaning) in categories 
existing in the world independent of human being. 
Dreyfus, especially with his often cited book What Computers Can't 
Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason, has strongly criticised 
computationalism; his criticism is inspired by the Heideggerian criticism to 
the reductionist position, rooted in the Cartesian philosophy, of 
computationalism. According to Heidegger cognition is the result of our 
experience in being-in-the-world, and is grounded in our disposition to 
react in a flexible way as required by a specific context (Froese 2007). 
Guided by this idea, Dreyfus (2007) claims that the representation of 
significance and relevance is the main problem of computationalism: 
assuming that a computer stores facts about the world, how can it manage 
to know which facts are relevant in any given situation?. 
A version of the relevance problem is the well known frame problem 
(Dennet 1984), (McCarthy 1969), i.e. the problem for a computer, running 
a representation of the world, in managing world changes: which changes 
are relevant for the new situation? Which have to be retained, since 
relevant? How to determine what is relevant and what is not? 
The frame problem may be considered as a manifestation of symptoms 
of the symbol grounding problem (Harnad 1990). Harnad questions the 
claim of computationalism that semantic interpretation of a formal 
symbolic system is intrinsic to the system itself; instead, he claims that 
meaningless symbols, manipulated on the basis of their shape, are 
grounded in anything but other meaningless symbols. Imagine we have a 
calculator and type 2+2=4: it is undoubted that this makes sense, but it 
makes sense in our head and not in the calculator. 
Furthermore, a symbolic system is vulnerable to the Searle's Chinese 
Room argument (Harnad 1994), discussed in (Searle 1980) as a criticism 
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to the computationalism position according to which an appropriately 
programmed computer is a mind and has cognitive states.  
Another questioned point is related to the traditional view of categories: 
on the objectivist view a category is defined as a set of “things” that share 
certain properties, which are necessary and sufficient conditions for 
defining the category itself. Implications of this position are: (i) members 
of a category are all equivalent, there is not a better example; (ii) 
categories are independent of any peculiarity of people doing the 
categorisation; (iii) new categories are derived through the composition of 
existing categories on a set-theoretic base. 
According to Rosch (1978) most categories do not have clear-cut 
boundaries and exhibit a prototype effect, i.e. some members are better 
examples of a category than others (“apple” is a better example of the 
category “fruit” than “fig”). Rosch refers to a perceived world, rather than 
a metaphysical one without a knower: an object is put in a category on the 
basis of a similarity judgement to the category prototype as perceived by a 
knower. This means that human capacities to perceive, to form mental 
images, to organise “things” play their role in categorisation; categories are 
culture-dependent conventions shared by a given group of people, and 
become accepted at global level through a communicative process (Licata 
2008), (Gärdenfors 2000). 
As a first alternative approach to computationalism, connectionism is 
based on the assumption that we need to simulate the brain structure and 
functioning in order to understand cognition. Connectionism claims that 
cognition is the result of the emergence of global states from a network of 
simple connected components: the focus is primarily on learning, rather 
than on problem solving. Several authors have debated if this is actually a 
new paradigm or rather a different approach to the implementation of 
classical systems. What differentiates connectionism from 
computationalism is basically the functional architecture of the 
computation (parallel vs. serial), and the nature of the representation (sub-
symbolic vs. symbolic); for both connectionism and computationalism 
cognition is basically a form of information processing. Both approaches 
lack of embodiment and autonomy (Searle 1980). 
2.2 Experiential realism 
Different studies in anthropology, linguistics, psychology show results in 
conflict with the objectivist view of the mind; the evidence suggests a 
different view of human cognition, whose characteristics are briefly 
summarized: 
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• Mind is embodied, meaning that our cognitive system is determined by 
our body. Our thoughts, ideas, concepts, and other aspects of our mind 
are shaped by our body, by our perceptual system, by our activity and 
experience in the world (Lakoff 1987); 
• Thought is imaginative, and employs metaphors, metonymies and image 
schemas. This imaginative capacity is embodied since metaphors, 
metonymies and images are often based on bodily experience (Lakoff 
1987); 
• Thought has gestalt properties, i.e. the way our brain operates is holistic, 
parallel, and analogue with self-organising tendencies, thus it is not 
atomistic (Lakoff 1987); 
• Cognitive models are mainly image-schematic and not propositional. 
Metaphors and metonymies, which are considered exceptional features 
on the traditional view, play a foundational role since they are 
transformations of image-schemas (Gärdenfors 2000); 
• Concepts show prototype effects (Gärdenfors 2000); 
• Meaning is a conceptual structure in a cognitive system (Gärdenfors 
2000). 
Experiential realism claims that cognitive processes emerge from real-
time, goal-directed interactions between agents and their environment. 
Experiential realism and the embodied hypothesis root their basis in the 
Heideggerian philosophy. In Being and Time (Heidegger 1927) Heidegger 
claims that the world is experienced as a significant whole and cognition is 
grounded in our skilful disposition to respond in a flexible and appropriate 
way to the significance of the contextual situation. 
The world is made up of possibilities for action that require appropriate 
responses. Things in the world are not experienced in terms of entities with 
functional characteristics; rather our experience when pressed into 
possibilities deals directly responding to a “what-for”: thus, a hammer is 
“for” hammering and our action of hammering discovers the readiness-to-
hand of the hammer itself. The readiness-to-hand is not a fixed 
functionality or characteristic encountered in a specific situation; rather it 
is experienced as a solicitation that requires a flexible response to the 
significance of a specific context (Dreyfus 2007). This is similar to what 
Gibson calls “affordances” (Gibson 1977). Affordance is what matter 
when we are confronting an environment; we experience entities of the 
environment that solicit us to act in a skilful way, rather than their physical 
features, which do not influence our action directly. 
The notion of “image schemas” has been jointly introduced by Lakoff 
and Johnson as a fundamental pillar of experiential realism (Hampe 2005). 
Image schemas are recurring and dynamic patterns of out perceptual 
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interactions with the world that give coherence to our experience; they are 
pre-conceptual structures directly meaningful since they are grounded in 
our bodily experience, and have an inherent spatial structure constructed 
from basic topological and geometrical structures, i.e. “container”, 
“source-path-goal”, “link” (Gärdenfors 2000). Metaphors and metonymies 
are considered as cognitive operations that transform image schemas from 
a source to a target mental space. Fauconnier and Turner call this process 
“conceptual blending” (Fauconnier 1994). 
Since image schemas are conceptual structures, they pertain to a 
particular individual: the question is how individual mental spaces become 
shared conventions (Gärdenfors 2006).Recent studies demonstrate that 
conventions emerge out of a communicative process between agents 
(Steels 2006), (Loula 2005), (Puglisi 2008). 
Puglisi (2008) shows how a common language may emerge as a result 
of a communicative dialogue. A simulation with an assembly of agents 
demonstrates that a simple negotiation scheme, based on game theory, may 
guarantee the emergence of a self-organised communication system 
capable of discriminating and categorising objects in the world with few 
linguistic categories: in the simulation individual agents are endowed with 
the ability to form perceptual categories, while interaction/communication 
among agents produces the emergence and alignment of the linguistic 
categories. 
As Gärdenfors (2006) puts it, semantics, thus meaning, is a “meeting of 
mind” where a communicative interaction enables to reach a semantic 
equilibrium. 
2.2 Enactivism 
Several authors (Dreyfus 2007), (Di Paolo 2003, 2007), (Froese 2007), (De 
Jaegher 2007) argue that paradoxically this meeting of mind is what is 
actually missing in empirical and theoretical investigation of the embodied 
hypothesis, where the focus is rather on agent’s individual cognitive 
mechanisms as a form of closed sensorimotor feedback loops. 
Enactivism is an attempt to move embodied practices beyond their 
current focus (Froese 2007). Enactivism is a term used by Maturana, 
Varela, Thomson, and Rosch to name their theories and is closely related 
to experiential realism; it is not a radically new idea, rather it is a synthesis 
of different ideas and approaches (Maturana 1980). Enactivism is 
characterised by five main ideas (Di Paolo 2007): 
• Autonomy: cognising organisms are autonomous by virtue of their self-
generated identity. A system whose identity is specified by a designer 
Geospatial semantics: beyond ontologies, towards an enactive approach      9 
cannot exhibit autonomy since it can only “obey” to rules imposed in 
the design. Autonomous agency emphasises the role of the cogniser in 
determining the rules of the “game” being played; 
• Sense-making: in our being-in-the-world we try to preserve our self-
generated identity through interactions and exchanges with the 
environment which are significant for us; we actively participate in the 
creation of meaning via our action, rather than passively receive 
stimulus from the environment and create internal “images” of it. De 
Jaegher (2007) further extends the notion of sense-making into the 
realm of social cognition, where the active coupling of an agent is with 
another agent. This is what Barsalou (2003) calls social-embodiment ; 
• Emergence: the notions of autonomy and sense-making invoke 
emergence. Autonomy is not a property of something, but the result of a 
new identity that emerges out of dynamical processes. Emergence 
means the formation of a new property or process with its own 
autonomous identity out of the interaction of existing processes; 
• Embodiment: for enactivism cognition is embodied action, temporally 
and spatially embedded. Reasoning, problem solving, and mental 
images manipulation depend on bodily structures  
• Experience: experience is a skilful aspect of embodied activity. As we 
progress from beginners to experts our performance improves, but 
experience also changes. 
The following table is a short synopsis of the different approaches to 
cognition: 
 Computationalism Connectionism Embodiment/ 
Enactivism 
Metaphor 
for the mind 
Mind as computer 
(Turing machine) 













global states in a 




the world and 
with other 
agents 













Mind/body Separable Separable Inseparable 
Table 1: synopsis of different approaches to cognition 
10      Pasquale Di Donato 
3 Dealing with semantics in information systems 
In the domain of distributed information systems the role of semantics for 
the automatic/semi-automatic exploitation of distributed resources is 
particularly emphasised. This process requires semantic interoperability, 
i.e. the capability of an information system to understand the semantic of a 
user request against that of an information source and mediate among them 
(Sheth 1999).  
But how can semantics be specified? Uschold (2003) proposes the 
following classification: (i) implicit semantics; (ii) informally expressed 
semantics; (iii) formally expressed semantics for human consumption; (iv) 
formally expressed semantics for machine processing. 
In (Sheth 2005) the following classification is proposed: 
• Implicit semantics: is the semantic implicit in patterns in data and not 
explicitly represented, i.e. co-occurrence of documents or terms in 
clusters, hyperlinked documents; 
• Formal semantics in the form of ontologies: in order to be machine 
readable and processable, semantics need to be represented in some sort 
of formalism. Formal languages are based on the notion of Model and 
Model Theory: expressions in the language are interpreted in models 
assumed to be representations of the world or of possible worlds. 
Description logics (DLs) is the current dominant formalism: based on 
sets theory, it has the drawback of being not able to represent graded 
concept membership and uncertainty; 
• Powerful (soft) semantics: implies the use of fuzzy or probabilistic 
mechanisms to overcome the rigid interpretations of set-based 
mechanisms, and enables to represent degrees of memberships and 
certainty. 
In an environment of distributed, heterogeneous data sources and 
information systems, semantic interoperability refers to the ability of 
systems to exchange data and software functionalities in a meaningful 
way; semantic heterogeneity, i.e. naming and conceptual conflicts arises 
when there is no agreement on the meaning of the same data and/or 
software functionality. 
Explicit and formal semantic is seen as a solution to the problem, and 
this has motivated several authors to apply formal ontologies (Guarino 
1998). Current practices, therefore, rely on ontologies creation and 
automated resources annotation, coupled with appropriate computational 
approaches, such as reasoning and query processing, for concept matching 
among different ontologies and against user queries (Sheth 2005). 
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Notwithstanding ontologies are seen as a solution to semantic 
heterogeneity, the irony is that a clear understanding of ontology itself is 
far to be achieved (Agarwal 2005), and this understanding varies across 
disciplines. 
As philosophical discipline Ontology (with a capital “o”) is the study of 
the “being qua being” (Guarino 1995), i.e. the explanation of the reality 
via concepts, relations, and rules; the term ontology (with a lowercase “o”) 
in the philosophical sense refers to a specific system of categories 
accounting for a specific idea of the world (e.g. Aristotle’s ontology); in 
computer science an ontology refers to “An engineering artifact, 
constituted by a specific vocabulary used to describe a certain reality, plus 
a set of explicit assumptions regarding the intended meaning of the 
vocabulary words” (Guarino 1998, 4). 
Ontologies enable to capture in an explicit and formal way the 
semantics of information sources. In a distributed environment such as the 
Web, resources are distributed and there is often the need to integrate 
different information in order to satisfy a user request. Semantic 
integration of information relies, currently, on ontologies integration: the 
process requires the identification of concepts similarity between 
ontologies and against user requests. 
There are different ways of employing ontologies for information 
integration; Wache (2001) identifies three framework architectures: 
• Single ontology approach: all information sources are related to one 
common global (top-level) ontology. The approach assumes that all 
information sources have nearly the same conceptualisation; 
• Multiple ontologies approach: each information source has its own 
ontology. Since it cannot be assumed that these ontologies share the 
same conceptualisation, the lack of a common vocabulary makes the 
integration process difficult. In this case an inter-ontology mapping is 
required: this mapping tries to identify semantically correlated terms via 
semantic similarity measurement; 
• Hybrid approach; hybrid approaches try to overcome the drawbacks of 
the two previous approaches. Each information source is described via 
its own ontology, but all source ontologies are built from the same 
global (top-level) ontology. 
Semantic similarity measurements play a crucial role in this process, 
since they provide mechanisms for comparing concepts from different 
ontologies, and are, thus, the basis of semantic interoperability (a survey of 
different approaches to measuring similarity is provided in (Goldstone 
2005)). 
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Since different ontologies may commit to different conceptualizations 
and may be implemented with different formalisms, inconsistency is 
inevitable. Ontology mismatches may be classified in two broad categories 
(Visser 1997): 
• Conceptualisation mismatches: are inconsistencies between 
conceptualisations of a domain, which may differ in terms of 
ontological concepts or in the way these concepts are related (i.e. in a 
subsumption hierarchy); 
• Explication mismatches: are related to the way the conceptualisation is 
specified, and occur when two ontologies have different definitions, but 
their terms, and concepts are the same.  
The information integration process would be straightforward, at a 
certain degree, if all ontologies would be similar in terms of vocabulary, 
intended meaning, background assumptions, and logical formalism, but in 
a distributed environment this situation is hard, if not impossible, to 
achieve since different users have different preferences and assumptions 
tailored to their specific requirements in specific domains. 
Notwithstanding the efforts to establish standards for ontology 
languages and basic top-level ontologies, there are still different 
approaches and heterogeneity between ontologies is inevitable (Krotzsch 
2005). 
Several authors (Goguen 2004, 2005, 2005a), (Krotzsch 2005), 
(Zimmermann 2006), are investigating the application of category theory 
to this issue. Goguen (2005) presents a theory of concepts (Unified 
Concept Theory – UCT) that integrates different approaches – Lattice of 
Theories (LOT), Formal Concept Analysis (FCA), Information Flow (IF), 
Conceptual Spaces, Conceptual Integration (Blending), Ontologies – while 
preserving their underlying conceptualizations. UCT approach to semantic 
integration uses category theory tools to unify all these approaches and 
generalises them to arbitrary logics based on the theory of institutions 
(Goguen 2004a). 
Ontology-based approach to semantics is receiving also more 
foundational criticisms. Gärdenfors (2004) advocates, for example, that 
this approach is not very semantic; at the best it is ontological. Since it 
continues to build entirely on the symbolic methodology, it suffers from 
the symbol grounding problem; the question is how expressions in 
ontology languages may get any meaning beyond the formal language 
itself: ontologies are not grounded. 
Another difficulty with ontologies is that they are decontextualised and 
decontextualise experience; instead we claim that semantics reconciliation 
depends on contextual human sense-making. Ontologies are forms of a 
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priori agreements on a shared conceptualisation of a domain of interest, 
but meaning is an emergent feature arising context-dependently in action 
and acquired via participatory sense-making of socially coupled agents, 
rather than defined as symbolic rules (Di Paolo 2007), (De Jaegher 2007), 
(Flender 2008), (Dourish 2004). 
Therefore, the use of ontologies is insufficient in a dynamic situation, 
where all interpretations may not be anticipated and on-the-fly integration 
may be needed (Ouksel 2003). 
Several authors have proposed emergent semantics (Aberer 2004) as a 
solution; emergent semantics envisions a community of self-organising, 
autonomous agents interacting in a dynamic environment and negotiating 
meaning as required: this means that meaning emerges in context, but 
context itself is an emergent property, a feature of interaction of a 
community of practice (Dourish 2004).Emergent semantics is dynamic and 
self-referential, as a result of a self-organisation process; this requires 
some autonomous behaviour (cf. 2.2). 
Collaborative tagging is a new paradigm of the web, where users are 
enabled to manage, share and browse collection of resources and to 
describe them with semantically meaningful freely chosen keywords 
(tags). These tags cannot even be considered as vocabularies, since there is 
no fixed set of tags nor explicit agreement on their use. Nevertheless, this 
set of unstructured, not explicitly coordinated tags evolves and leads to the 
emergence of a loose categorisation system (folksonomy) shared and used 
by a community of practice (Cattuto 2007). 
Collaborative tagging falls within the scope of semiotic dynamics, i.e. 
the study of how a population of agents establish a shared semiotic system. 
Semiotic dynamics has been defined as “[...] the process whereby groups 
of people or artificial agents collectively invent and negotiate shared 
semiotic dynamics, which they use for communication or information 
integration” (Steels 2006, 32). Semiotic dynamics builds on different AI 
techniques, borrowing also ideas from the embodied hypothesis: the focus, 
however, is on social, collective, dynamic sense-making. 
Computer simulations (Loula 2005), (Baronchelli 2006), (Puglisi 2008) 
have demonstrated that a population of embodied agents can self-organise 
a semiotic system.  
4 Semantics and geographic information 
Traditionally GIScience has relied on an objectivistic approach to 
knowledge creation (Schuurman 2006): this view assumes that GISystems 
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represent the “real world” as it is independent of human cognition and 
perception of it (Schuurman 2002). The focus, therefore, has been 
ontological in nature more than epistemological; in determining geo-
spatial ontologies, the question of “what exists” has gained much attention 
versus the question of “how what exists is identified and defined” 
(Agarwal 2005). 
Starting from early 1990s, however, several researchers have focused 
their attention on the epistemological aspects of GIS, accounting for 
human cognition and perception. These authors borrow ideas from the 
experiential realism and the epistemological model introduced by (Lakoff 
1987), arguing that cognition structures the perception and representation 
of reality: their work builds on image schemata, conceptual blending, 
conceptual spaces, and affordances. 
Semantic issues have always been a key concern in GIS, since semantic 
interoperability plays a crucial role for the sharing and integration of 
geographic information (Harvey 1999). The use of ontologies is the most 
applied means to support semantic interoperability, and ontology has been 
recognized as a major research theme in GIScience (Mark 2000) 
It is possible to individuate two main approaches to ontology in GIS: 
• Philosophical approach: deals with top-level ontologies for the 
geographic domain, and takes an objectivistic view, i.e. reality as 
objectively existent independent of human cognition and perception. 
Works on this approach are, for example, (Mark 1999, 2001), (Smith 
2001, 2004), (Frank 2001, 2007), (Kuhn 2003, 2005),(Galton 2003). 
Some of these authors highlight some issues, e.g. vagueness as well as 
cultural and subjective discrepancies that are difficult to solve: Mark 
(2003) has shown that people from different places and cultures use 
different categories for geographic features; 
• Knowledge engineering approach: deals with ontologies as application-
specific and purpose-driven engineering artifacts. Works on this 
approach are, for example, from (Kuhn 2001), (Camara 2000), 
(Hakimpour 2001), (Fonseca 2002), (Bernard 2003), (Klien 2004), 
(Raubal 2004), (Lutz 2006). 
Frank (2001) suggests that an ontology for GIS should be built as a 
coordinated set of tiers of ontologies, allowing different ontological 
approaches to be integrated in a unified system constituted of the following 
tiers: (i) Tier 0 – human-independent reality; (ii) Tier 1 – observation of 
the physical world; (iii) Tier 2 – objects with properties; (iv) Tier 3 – 
social reality; (v) Tier 4 – subjective knowledge 
Frank’s five-tier architecture has a lot of commonalities with the four-
universes paradigm (Gomes 1998) applied to geographic information by 
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(Camara 2000a). Inspired by this last work, and based on a realistic view 
of the world, Fonseca (2002a), introduces a five-universes paradigm: (i) 
physical universe; (ii) cognitive universe; (iii) logical universe; (iv) 
representation universe; (v) implementation universe. Representing the 
reality involves the conceptualisation of elements of the physical world via 
a collective agreement of a community sharing common perceptions; 
concepts are defined within a community of experts and are organised in a 
logical framework (ontologies). 
Halfway between a philosophical and an engineering approach, Kuhn 
(2003) proposes the Semantic Reference System as a framework for 
solving semantic interoperability problems. In analogy with spatial 
reference systems, semantic reference systems are composed of a semantic 
reference frame and a semantic datum: as the geometric component of 
geographic information refers to spatial reference systems, the thematic 
component refers to semantic reference systems. A semantic reference 
frame acts like a coordinate system, as a framework to which terms can 
refer to get meaning: this reference frame is a formally defined top-level 
ontology. As a datum in spatial reference systems anchors the geometry 
model to the real world, a semantic datum grounds the terms of semantic 
reference frame: Kuhn (2005) suggests using image schemas as grounding 
mechanism.  
From a knowledge engineering point of view, ontologies have been 
applied for (i) geographic information discovery and retrieval (Bernard 
2003), (Klien 2004), (Lutz 2006); (ii) geographic information integration 
(Sheth 1999), (Visser 2002), (Wache 2001), (Hakimpour 2001); (iii) 
GISystems (Fonseca 1999, 2002); (iv) modelling user activity (Camara 
2000), (Kuhn 2001), (Raubal 2004), (Timpf 2002). 
Application-specific, task-oriented, purpose-driven ontologies are aimed 
at information systems development: these ontologies emerge from 
requirements and contain knowledge limited to a specific area of 
application. 
The main issue with engineering ontologies is grounding: according to 
the ontology hierarchy proposed in (Guarino 1998), domain and task 
ontologies are grounded in top-level ontologies. The question is how these 
top-level ontologies are grounded themselves: this infinite regress should 
end at some point to an ontology, but this is objectivism/reductionism and 
we are not in sympathy with this approach.  
Borrowing ideas from embodied cognition and cognitive semantics, 
some authors propose image schemas as grounding mechanism and 
conceptual spaces as a new representation paradigm. Kuhn (2003), for 
example, proposes image schemas for grounding Semantic Reference 
Systems. Image schemas have been introduced in the geospatial domain by 
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(Mark 1989), have received formal specifications in (Rodriguez 1997) and 
(Frank 1999), and have been applied, for example, to way finding in 
(Raubal 1998). 
However, the concept of image schemas remain controversial and 
ambiguous, and disagreements exist in image schemas research between 
two broadly contrasting approaches: the first approach, located in the 
context of cognitive psychology and neurosciences, considers image 
schemas as expression of universal principles; the second approach, 
located in the context of anthropology and cognitive-cultural linguistics, 
has a more relativistic view of image schemas and emphasises that 
cognition is situated in socio-culturally determined context (Hampe 2005). 
Cross-linguistic and cross-cultural studies (Choi 1999) show that image 
schemas, while operating in many languages, are not universal, instead 
they are culturally situated (Correa 2005); on the other hand, the tendency 
to make universalistic statements is based on few languages, above all 
English (Zlatev 2007). 
Some major drawbacks exist in the ontology approach to semantics in 
terms of dynamicity and context. Ontologies are a priori agreements on a 
shared conceptualisation of a domain of interest, a form of pre-given, 
decontextualised knowledge; this is problematic as long as we consider the 
temporal extent on the knowledge. 
There is an empirical evidence of the fact that human manipulation of 
concepts is facilitated by considering them in relevant context (Barsalou 
1993). Current approaches to context, also in the GI field (Rogriguez 
1999), (Keßler 2007), are representational, i.e. they assume that context is 
stable, delimited information that can be known and encoded in just 
another information layer or another ontology in an information system. 
Meaning, instead, is an emergent feature arising context-dependently in 
action and acquired via participatory sense-making of socially coupled 
agents, rather than as symbolic rules, and context itself is an emergent 
feature (Di Paolo 2007), (De Jaegher 2007), (Dourish 2004). 
5 Toward a new formalism for geospatial semantics 
We start from the assumption that meaning and context are dynamically 
emergent from activity and interaction, determined in the moment and in 
the doing (Dourish 2004): there is no pre-given knowledge and no fixed 
properties that can a priori determine what is relevant. 
Current approaches to semantics, mainly ontology-based, are not able to 
satisfy and manage this assumption, and a new formalism is required. 
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The State-Context-Property (SCOP) formalism seems promising in this 
sense: a detailed description of the formalism can be found in (Aerts 2005, 
2005a), (Gabora 2002, 2008), here a brief description is provided. SCOP is 
a formalism based on a generalisation of mathematics developed for 
quantum mechanics that provides a means for dealing with context, 
concept combination and similarity judgments, toward a contextual theory 
of concepts (Gabora 2008). 
At conceptual level SCOP falls within the enactive approach to 
cognition: the main ideas behind it may be summarised as follows: 
• Concepts as participatory (ecological view): concepts and categories are 
participating parts of the mind-world whole; 
• Contextuality: context influences the meaning of concepts and needs to 
be given a place in the description of concepts; 
• Concept combination: concept conjunctions exhibit emergent features 
that traditional theories (representational), are not able to “predict”; 
• Similarity: similarity judgments are context-dependent. 
The description of a concept in SCOP consists of five elements: 
• A set of states the concept may assume; 
• A set of relevant contexts; 
• A set of relevant properties; 
• A function describing the applicability of certain properties in a specific 
state and context; 
• A function describing the probability for one state to collapse into an 
other under the influence of a specific context. 
For any concept we may have a number (infinite) of “possible” states, 
and each state is characterised by a unique typicality for instances and 
properties. A state of a concept that is not influenced by a specific context 
is said to be an eigenstate1 for that context, otherwise it is said to be a 
potential state (superimposition state). A potential state may collapse to 
another state under the influence of a specific context: for example 
consider the concept Tree that under the context “Desert island” might 
collapse to state Palm Tree. 
The properties of a concept are themselves potential: they are not 
definite except in a specific context. If a concept is in an eigenstate for a 
context, then the latter just detects what the concept is in acto (Gabora 
2008), but if the concept is in a superposition state, then the context change 
this state: properties of the concepts may change under the influence of the 
                                                     
1 An eigenstate is a state associated with definite properties 
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context from actual to potential and vice versa. Therefore each state of a 
concept is an eigenstate or a superposition state: if it is an eigenstate the 
properties are actual, otherwise most of the properties are potential: a 
context has the “power” to change a superposition state in an eigenstate. 
The various states of a concept can be described as a Hilbert Space, 
while the conjunction of two concepts can be modelled as an 
entanglement2 through the tensor product of the two Hilbert Spaces 
describing those concepts. 
Similarity judgments between two concepts are only possible if their 
respective properties are compatible, i.e. they refer to the same context 
(refer to Gabora 2002 for a detailed description of context-sensitive 
measure of conceptual distance). 
Future work 
This work has dealt with semantics and how it is addressed in distributed 
information system and in the GI domain. Drawbacks of current practices, 
mainly based on ontologies, have been highlighted. 
Ontology-based approach to semantics is problematic in terms of 
dynamicity and context, since ontologies, being forms of a priori 
agreements, are decontextualised.  
Instead we claim for an enactive approach to cognition and semantics 
where meaning is an emergent feature arising context-dependently in 
action. 
Since representational theories are unable to deal with these issues, a 
new formalism is required. The SCOP formalism is considered promising 
and has been briefly described. 
Future work will deal with an in depth analysis of the formalism in 
order to investigate its applicability to GI, possibly toward practical 
applications. 
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